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Abstract 
A short introduction to goal problems in abstract gambling theory is given, 
along with statements of some of the main theorems and a number of examples, open 
problems and references. Emphasis is on the ﬁnite-state, countably-additive setting 
with such classical objectives as reaching a goal, hitting a goal inﬁnitely often, staying 
in the goal, and maximizing the average time spent at a goal. 
1. Introduction 
In the classical gamblers’ ruin problem (cf. Feller [F]) a gambler beginning with x0 
dollars bets $1 at each play, winning a dollar with probability p and losing a dollar 
with probability q = 1  −  p, until he either goes broke (hits 0) or else reaches a given 
goal such as $1000. The successive wins/losses are independent, and he has no control 
over the game or decisions to inﬂuence his likelihood of winning. 
In many real-life gambling situations, however, the gambler is not forced to 
make the same wager at each step, but rather he is free to select from a variety of 
strategies. For example, in red-and-black (cf. [DSa]) the gambler may at each step 
bet any amount b less than or equal to his current fortune x and he  then wins  b  dollars 
with probability p and loses b dollars with probability q (i.e., he moves to x + b with 
probability p and to x − b with probability q). 
It is this freedom of selection of strategies which is the essence of abstract mathe­
matical gambling theory, and the purpose of this article is to give a brief introduction 
* Partially supported by U.S. National Science Foundation Grant DMS-95-03375. 
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to this rich and deep sub-ﬁeld of discrete-time stochastic control, with emphasis on 
ﬁnite-state (hence countably-additive) gambling problems with ﬁxed goals. As such, 
the ideas reviewed here are a small part of the general abstract theory of gambling 
which includes general state spaces (including questions of measurable and general 
non-measurable selection strategies) and general payoﬀ or utility functions. Dubins 
and Savage’s classic treatise [DSa] is the basis for many of the ideas presented here; 
for a more extensive introduction to the subject, and its application to the ﬁeld of 
stochastic games, the reader is referred to Maitra and Sudderth’s ([MS1], [MS2]) re­
cent articles. Abstract gambling theory, in turn, is part of the mathematical theory of 
stochastic processes, and is closely related to Blackwell’s (e.g., [Bl]) theory of dynamic 
programming. 
2. Gambling Problems and Strategies 
The purpose of this section is to give a formal mathematical description of gambling 
problems and strategies; notation will generally follow that in [MS1]. 
A gambling problem is a triple (S,Γ, u) where: S is the state space (in this 
exposition always a nonempty ﬁnite set), which represents the gambler’s possible 
fortunes; Γ is a function from S to nonempty sets of probability measures deﬁned on 
(the sigma algebra of all subsets of) S, where  Γ(x) represents the bets or gambles 
available to the player when his fortune is x � S; and  u  is a bounded function (called 
the payoﬀ function) from SIN to the real numbers which the gambler is trying to 
maximize. 
Example 2.1. (Red-and-black) S = {0, 1, . . . , 2g−  2}, Γ(x) =  {�(x)}  for x � g, and  
for x < g, Γ(x) =  {p�(x + j) +  q�(x − j) :  j  = 0, 1, . . . , x}, where  �(a) is the dirac 
delta measure with mass 1 on the singleton {a}. The goal here is to reach at least g, 
so u is the function u(x1, x2, . . .) = 1  if  xj  �  g  for some j, and = 0 otherwise. Note 
that Γ(0) = {�(0)} (so 0 and all states x � g are absorbing states) and that for this 
classical formulation of red-and-black, a sequence of fortunes which never reaches g 
is worthless, no matter how close to g it comes. 
A strategy available to the gambler who has initial fortune x0 is a selection rule δ 
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which associates to each ﬁnite sequence of fortunes x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn  a single gamble 
δ(x0, x1, . . . , xn)  �  Γ(xn). Thus an initial gamble δ(x0) � Γ(x0) is selected, and 
then for every subsequent stage of play, one single gamble is identiﬁed from the set 
of gambles available at the current fortune. In general, strategies may be heavily 
dependent on the past histories of fortunes, but two important natural and compar­
atively simple classes of strategies are those of stationary strategies, which depend 
only on the current fortune, and Markov strategies, which depend on the current 
fortune and time. Thus a stationary strategy satisﬁes δ(x0, x1, . . . , xn) =  γ(xn) for  
all x0, . . . , xn  �  S, where for each x � S, γ(x) � Γ(x) is a ﬁxed gamble which 
will be used whenever the current fortune is x; each such strategy corresponds to a 
single Markov chain on S with stationary transition probabilities (selected to be in 
Γ). Similarly, a Markov strategy corresponds to a Markov chain on S whose transi­
tion probabilities at time n are independent of past successions of states, formally, 
δ(x0, x1, . . . , xn) =  δ(x0, x1, x2, . . . , x ) whenever xn = xn. (Note that by deﬁnition n
all stationary strategies are Markov.) 
Example 2.2. (Timid play in red-and-black). Deﬁne the strategy δt by 
δt(x0, x1, . . . , xn) =  p�(xn + 1) +  q�(xn − 1) for all 0 < x < g. This is the station­
ary strategy which selects the smallest possible nonzero bet at each (non-absorbing) 
state. 
Example 2.3. (Bold play in red-and-black). Deﬁne the stationary strategy δb by 
δb(x0, x1, . . . , xn) =  p�(xn + k) +  q�(xn − k) where for xn < g,  k  = min{xn, g −  xn}  
is the largest available bet which will not overshoot the goal. So in particular if 
g = 1000, δb prescribes a bet of exactly of 3 dollars if the current fortune is either 3 
or 997, etc. 
Example 2.4. (A nonstationary Markov strategy in red-and-black). Deﬁne δM by 
δM (x0, x1, . . . , xn) =  δb(x0, . . . , xn) if  n <  10, and = δt(x0, . . . , xn) if  n  �  10. This 
simple Markov strategy switches from bold play to timid play at time 10. 
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Example 2.5. (A non-Markov strategy in red-and-black). Deﬁne δN by 
δN (x0, x1, . . . , xn) =  δb(x0, x1, . . . , xn) if  x1  < 3, and = �(xn) otherwise. This some­
what irrational strategy uses bold play at time n if the fortune at time 1 was < 3, 
and otherwise stagnates forever. 
Each strategy δ induces a countably-additive probability measure P on the 
Borel subsets of SIN in a natural way as follows. First, P (x1 × SIN) =  δ(x0)({x1}), 
i.e., the probability that the sequence starts with x1 is the measure of x1 under 
the initial gamble chosen, δ(x0) � Γ(x0). Next P ((x1, x2)  ×  SIN) =  δ(x0)({x1}) · 
δ(x0, x1)({x2}), etc. In other words, if X1, X2, . . . ,  represent the fortunes at times 
1, 2, . . ., then  X1  has distribution δ(x0), and the conditional distribution of X2 given 
X1 = x1 is δ(x0, x1), etc. Thus a given strategy δ determines the complete joint dis­
tribution P of the stochastic process X1, X2, . . . of states via the standard extension 
from the measures of those cylinder sets. 
For example,  in bold play  δb  for red-and-black (with g = 100, say, and x0 = 10), 
2Pb (X1 = 10) = 0, Pb (X1 = 20, X2  = 40) = p , Pb (X1 = 20, X2  = 0) =  pq, etc.  
3. The Optimal Return Function and the Value of a Strategy 
Recall that the payoﬀ function u is a bounded real-valued function on SIN, the set 
of all inﬁnite sequences of states (often called histories), and that each strategy δ 
determines a unique probability measure on the Borel subsets of SIN . 
The value of strategy δ is simply the expected payoﬀ V (δ) with respect to the 
probability distribution P deﬁned by δ, that  is  
V (δ) =  u dP  
SIN 
Example 3.1. In red-and-black, where the objective is simply to reach the goal g 
(i.e., u(x1, x2, . . .) = 1  if  xi  �  g  for some i, and = 0 otherwise), the value V (δ) of the  
strategy δ is simply 
V (δ) =  P  (Xi  �  g  for some i � 1), 
and since the timid-play strategy δt;x starting at x corresponds to the classical gam­
bler’s ruin problem, its value is simply the probability that a simple random walk 
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which starts from x and moves to the right with probability p will reach g before 
reaching 0, and the classical solution (cf. [DSa, p. 170]) is 
� �g−x 1 − p x 
V (δt;x) =  
p  �  q  �gpq  1  −  
q  
Example 3.2. The corresponding value for bold play in red-and-black starting at 
x, δb;x, is more complicated, but for small state spaces may be calculated easily as 
follows in the case g = 3.  V  (δb;0) =  0  and  V  (δb;g) = 1 by deﬁnition, and V (δb;1) 
and V (δb;2) satisfy V (δb;1) =  qV (δb;0) +  pV (δb;2), V (δb;2) =  qV (δb;1) +  pV (δb;g), 
which implies V (δb;1) =  p2/(1 − qp) and  V  (δb;2) =  p/(1 − qp). (Note that for g = 3,  
δt  =  δb.) 
The optimal payoﬀ function V is the real-valued function on S which is the 
optimal expected payoﬀ over all possible strategies starting at x 
V (x) = sup{V  (δ) :  δ  is a strategy starting at x}. 
That is, V (x) represents the best a gambler can do starting at x. 
An optimal strategy starting at x is a strategy at x satisfying 
V (δ) =  V  (x).  
In general, the values of general strategies and optimal payoﬀ functions are diﬃ­
cult to obtain explicitly, and a major contribution of [DSa] is a general theory which 
characterizes optimal payoﬀ functions. 
For red-and-black, however, it is known that for favorable games (i.e., p >  1/2)  
timid play is optimal [Br], and for unfavorable games (p ⊂ 1/2) bold play is optimal 
[DSa, Theorem 5.3.1]. This corresponds to the intuitively plausible idea that for 
favorable games, the random walk will tend to drift to the right, so taking steps as 
small as possible will make this drift look almost deterministic, making the probability 
of reaching the goal high. For unfavorable games however, the drift is to the left, and 
small bets will be a poor strategy for exactly the same reason; playing just the 
opposite by maximizing bets (bold play) is much better. 
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4. Goal Problems 
In a goal problem there is a ﬁxed set of goal states G � S, and the payoﬀ function u 
reﬂects various objectives associated with G such as reaching G at least once, hitting 
G inﬁnitely often, staying in G forever, or maximizing the average time spent in G. 
This section will survey some of the basic theorems about goal problems and give 
examples to illustrate them. 
Reaching a Goal. If S is ﬁnite and Γ(x) is ﬁnite for each x � S (that is, each state 
has only a ﬁnite number of gambles available at it), then there is always a stationary 
optimal strategy [DSa, Theorem 3.9.1] for the payoﬀ 
u(x1, x2, . . .) = 1  if  xi  �  G  for some i � 1, and = 0 otherwise. 
In red-and-black, bold play δb is one such optimal stationary strategy if p ⊂ 1/2, and  
timid play δt if p >  1/2. If  Γ(x) is inﬁnite for some x, there may exist no optimal 
strategies. 
Example 4.1. S = {0, 1, g}, Γ(0)  =  {�(0)}, Γ(1)  =  Γ(g) =  {p�(g)+  (1  −  p)�(0) : p <  
1}. Then  V (0) = 0, V (1) = 1, but V (δs) < 1 for any stationary strategy δs starting 
at state 1. 
As is seen in the above example, however, there do exist arbitrarily good sta­
tionary strategies (i.e., for each � > 0 there is a stationary strategy δ with V (δ ) �s s 
1 − �). This is always the case for ﬁnite-state goal problems with objective reaching 
the goal, which is a special case of [DSa, Theorem 3.9.2], and which was extended in 
[O, Theorem B] to countable S, and in [Su, Theorem 2.3] to a much larger class of 
problems including many with uncountable S and ﬁnitely additive transition proba­
bilities. Generalizing in other directions, for countable S there is always a stationary 
strategy which both (nearly) maximizes the probability of reaching the goal and 
(nearly) minimizes the expected time to the goal [DH1, Theorem 4.2]. For ﬁnite S 
there is always a Markov strategy which is monotonically improving and optimal is 
the limit along every history [HvW, Theorem 5.15], but such a strategy may not 
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always be constructed by simply switching to a “better” gamble at each successive 
return to a state; in some cases it is necessary to use certain gambles for arbitrary 
long time periods, then switch to a diﬀerent gamble for an even larger time, and so 
on, as can be seen Example 4.2 below. 
Hitting a Goal Inﬁnitely Often. In some goal problems, the objective is not just 
to reach the goal once, but to hit the goal inﬁnitely often with as high probability as 
possible, so 
u(x1, x2, . . .) = lim sup IG(xn), 
n�� 
where IG(·) is the indicator function of the goal set G. Even  if  S  has as few as three 
states, there may be strategies which hit the goal inﬁnitely often with high prob­
ability, but where each stationary strategy is worthless for this objective (Example 
4.1 above). On the other hand, in all ﬁnite-state goal problems, there always exist 
Markov strategies which nearly maximize the probability of hitting the goal inﬁnitely 
often [Hi, Theorem 8.1], but the structure of such good Markov strategies in general 
is much more complicated than just using a better gamble at each time period. 
Example 4.2. S = {0, 1, g}, Γ(0)  =  {�(0)}, Γ(g) =  {�(1)}, Γ(1)  =  {3−n�(0) + 
2−n�(g) +  (1  − 3−n  − 2−n)�(1) : n � IN} ≥ {�(1)}. Note that state 0 is absorbing, 
state g is reﬂecting, and each of the sets of gambles Γ(x) are closed. It can be checked 
using the conditional version of Borel-Cantelli (Le´vy 0-1 Law) that there exist Markov 
strategies which are arbitrarily good (and which necessarily use successive gambles 
for long time periods, roughly the order of 2n times), that no Markov strategy using 
each gamble at most a ﬁxed number of times N is good, and that limits of good 
strategies are not good, since every good strategy necessarily uses gambles closer and 
closer to �(1), itself a worthless gamble. 
Staying in the Goal. Analogous to the lim sup objective of hitting a goal inﬁnitely 
often, the payoﬀ function 
u(x1, x2, . . .) = lim inf IG(xn) 
n�� 
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reﬂects the objective of maximizing the probability that the process eventually stays 
in the goal set G forever. For countable S with this lim inf payoﬀ (and in fact for a 
much larger class of payoﬀs), there always exist arbitrarily good Markov strategies 
[HP, Theorem 4.1]. That neither good stationary strategies nor optimal Markov 
strategies exist in general can be seen in Example 4.1 above. 
Maximizing  the Average Time at a Goal.  An objective function which is between 
that of reaching a goal set once and eventually staying in the goal set forever is the 
objective of maximizing the average time spent in the goal, that is 
n 
−1 u(x1, x2, . . .) = lim sup n IG(xj ) 
n�� 
j=1 
(for ﬁnite S, lim sup and lim inf are equivalent [DH2, Corollary to Theorem 2]). 
If S is ﬁnite and Γ(x) is a  closed set (total-variation norm) of transition proba­
bilities for each x, then there always exist nearly-optimal stationary strategies for the 
objective of maximizing the average time in the goal [DH2, Theorem 1], in contrast 
to the objective of hitting a goal inﬁnitely often, as seen in Example 4.2 above. If 
Γ is arbitrary, there always exist nearly-optimal Markov strategies for this objective 
[DH2, Theorem 2]. As with previous objectives, the limit of nearly-optimal strategies 
may be worthless, as can be seen modifying Example 4.2 by letting Γ(g) =  �(g); all 
good strategies starting at 1 use gambles close to �(1), which is itself worthless for 
the average-time objective as well. 
Other Goal Payoﬀs. Other common payoﬀs in goal problems include those of 
discounted rewards (u(x1, x2, . . .) =  �nIG(xn) for  0  < � <  1 ﬁxed), ﬁnite­n=1 �Thorizon rewards (e.g., u(x1, x2, . . .) =  IG(x ) for  ﬁxed  T ), supremum rewards, n=1 n
product rewards, etc.; the interested reader is referred to [HP]. 
The proofs and applications of the above-mentioned results span a wide spec­
trum of standard probability theory including Markov chains, martingales, 0-1 laws, 
strong laws, randomizations, stochastic matrices, and dynamic programming, as well 
as intricate ad hoc arguments and a broad and deep general theory of inequalities 
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for stochastic processes in [DSa]; the references below are starting points to this 
interesting and powerful subject. 
5. Open Problems 
The fundamental gambling-theory text by Dubins and Savage [DSa] contains a well-
indexed list of open problems in this ﬁeld; the following are several additional ones. 
Q1.	 (cf. [Hi]) Do good Markov strategies exist in all countable-state goal problems 
with objective of hitting the goal inﬁnitely often? 
Q2.	 (cf. [HvW]) Do monotonically-improving limit-optimal strategies exist in all 
ﬁnite-state goal problems with average reward payoﬀ? 
Q3.	 (cf. [St]) For what general class of goal problems do good measurable strategies 
always exist? 
Q4.	 (cf. [Ho]) What are eﬃcient algorithms for computation of optimal or good strate­
gies in various classes of goal problems? 
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